Introduction

​When Asha, a small cafe owner in Bengaluru, listed her restaurant on both Zomato and Swiggy, she believed that being on two platforms would double her visibility and profits. Within months, however, she began noticing something unusual. Both platforms charged almost identical commissions, offered synchronised discounts, and ranked restaurants in strikingly similar ways. Competing ​with one meant competing with both. Yet when restaurateurs like her complained, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) could do little, because Indian law does not recognise the idea of collective dominance.

This gap in the law recently resurfaced in the Hindalco-Vedanta case, where the CCI dismissed allegations that the two copper producers, who together dominate nearly the entire domestic market, had abused a collective dominant position. The Commission reasoned that Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002, applies only to a single enterprise or to entities under common ownership or control. As a result, independent firms that exercise market power jointly, without formal coordination, fall outside the law’s reach.

This article argues that such a narrow interpretation weakens India’s competition enforcement. The notion of collective dominance has undergone a worldwide change, especially in the case of the European Union where it has taken the step of dealing with few companies quietly dominating the market. Finally, this paper claims that the recognition of collective dominance is necessary to connect the differences between India’s competition law and its market reality. Global Context of Collective Dominance 

Understanding Collective Dominance 

Collective dominance is a situation where a group of independent companies jointly possess such a large share of the market that their actions can be compared to that of one dominant player. While Indian Competition Law remains silent on this concept, the EU recognises it under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which prohibits abuse by “one or more undertakings in a dominant position.” The inclusion of “one or more” shows that the law recognises dominance can be shared, and that shared control can harm competition just as much as a monopoly.

Consequently, Europe’s jurisprudence has given this principle the practical depth it needs. Over time, competition authorities have recognised that in duopolistic markets, competition is diluted even without direct collusion. Companies become aware of each other’s strategies and gradually adjust their conduct in response. This parallel behavior  allows them to exercise joint control over the market. One such example of this principle can be seen in the case of Airtours plc v Commission, where the European Commission (EC) blocked Airtours’ proposal to acquire another tour operator company, namely First Choice.  EC’s reasoning for blocking this acquisition was that it would create a situation where the competition would be significantly reduced, and the remaining few firms in the market could coordinate their behaviour without any explicit agreement. Though this decision was annulled by the Court of First Instance on lack of economic evidence, the court eventually gave the legal test for collective dominance and held that in markets, dominance can be shared when firms recognise and adapt to each other’s conduct, have no incentive to deviate from coordinated strategies, and face limited competitive pressure. This decision showed that collective dominance is not rooted in explicit collusion or agreements.

Case Studies: Highlighting Enforcement Gaps

There have been several instances where India’s Competition law has continued to reject the principle of collective dominance. The recent case of Hindalco reflects this approach. The CCI in this case dismissed allegations that the two firms, which together control nearly the entire market for copper production in India, had abused a collective dominant position. The informant alleged that Hindalco and Vedanta together controlled India’s copper market and used that position to manipulate output and prices. The CCI dismissed the case, holding that Section 4 does not recognise collective dominance and that assessing each firm individually does not result in anti-competitive practice.

In the food delivery market, the CCI examined prima facie evidence against Zomato and Swiggy because the clauses in their agreements and practices with restaurant partners appeared to be restricting competition. The Commission specifically noted that their price parity clauses could stop restaurants from offering lower prices on their own websites or on competing platforms. It also observed that exclusivity arrangements could make restaurants dependent on one platform and reduce competition in the market. On this basis, CCI directed an investigation under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act, 2002. However, even at this stage, the issue was not examined as one of collective dominance. This limitation has repeated across multiple sectors. In the Ola-Uber case, the allegations were that both platforms used similar pricing systems and app-based algorithms, which led to parallel pricing in the taxi market. Yet the CCI held that the companies cannot be examined as collectively dominant because the Competition Act, 2002 does not recognises the same. Similarly, in the Amazon-Flipkart case, the allegations related to exclusive launches, preferential treatment of sellers on both platforms. The CCI directed an investigation into the issue, but it did not examine this as collective dominance. In complaints involving OYO, MakeMyTrip, and Goibibo, the CCI explicitly stated that “collective dominance” is not recognised under the Act.

Legislative History on Collective Dominance 

India takes a much narrower approach towards this issue. While market power in today’s world can be shared by a few independent firms, Indian competition law still defines dominance in a way that mainly focuses on a single enterprise or group. This creates a gap between how market power operates in practice and how it is defined in law. Section 4(1) of the Indian Competition Act, 2002 prohibits abuse of a dominant position by an “enterprise or group.” Yet, the term “group” under Section 2(a) is defined narrowly; it is restricted to entities under common ownership or control. This framing of the legislation excludes independent firms that jointly wield market power without being part of the same corporate structure. As a result, situations where two or more firms control a market, such as the recent Hindalco v. Vedanta case, remain outside of the purview of Section 4.

This narrow interpretation has left the law incapable of dealing with situations where independent entities [without any formal agreement] collectively hold significant market powers and manipulate the market. Acknowledging this limitation, policymakers proposed to correct it. The Competition (Amendment) Bill, 2012 sought to broaden the scope of Section 4 by adding the words “jointly or individually,” allowing the CCI to assess dominance exercised by multiple entities acting together. However, the proposal was dropped, and subsequent reform did not revive it. Moreover, the Competition Law Review Committee, in its 2019 report, emphasised that collective dominance was unnecessary because any coordinated conduct between enterprises could be dealt with under Section 3, which prohibits anti-competitive practices.

This reluctance to expand the notion of dominance beyond individual control prevents CCI from addressing duopolistic and oligopolistic conduct that produces predictable and parallel collusion. As a result, the law can observe how market power is shared between firms but remains unable to act, reflecting a growing disconnect between the Competition law and the structure of modern markets. This legislative silence is now evident across several Indian Duopolistic markets, where recurring allegations of collective dominance remain beyond the Commission’s reach. This silence is now evident across several Indian duopolistic markets, where repeated allegations of collective dominance continue to fall outside the Commission’s authority.

The Way Forward

By the aforementioned analysis, it becomes clear that India’s approach towards dominance needs refinement, not reinvention. To further refine the legislation, specific reforms can be introduced within the existing framework to make the law more responsive towards market trends. The first reform is the introduction of the word “jointly or individually” into Section 4(1), as this would enable CCI to examine market dominance that arises collectively, not just individually. The argument that cartel provision under Section 3 proves to be sufficient is misplaced, since it addresses explicit agreements, not independent behaviour that emerges without collusion. Hence, recognition of joint dominance under Section 4 would strengthen enforcement without arbitrarily expanding liability.

The reluctance of the CCI to recognise collective dominance arises from the narrow scope of Section 4, overlap with Section 3, and the evidentiary difficulty in proving coordinated behaviour. In furtherance of this interpretation, the CCI has refused to treat companies as collectively dominant. In the famous case of Apple/Vodafone/Airtel, the allegations were that Apple and telecom operators were jointly abusing their position in relation to the iPhone. The CCI rejected this contention on the grounds that the jurisprudence under Section 4 is settled and it excludes cases of collective dominance. The exclusion of this concept was also elaborated by the Competition Law Review Committee, under which they reasoned that collective dominance usually involves some form of coordination or parallelism. Such conduct is better examined under Section 3, rather than Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002.

To solve this statutory gap and give this reform effect, the CCI should issue guidelines on identifying collective dominance, focusing on economic indicators such as common ownership patterns and alignment in pricing across platforms. These guidelines will distinguish natural parallel behaviour from collective dominance. Critics may argue that such guidelines risk penalising firms simply for being successful in their markets. However, that is not what this framework targets. The point is not to punish success, but to step in where two or more firms together manipulate the terms of the market. In that sense, guidelines are not an extension of law; they are a constraint on it. As they define when intervention is justified, and just as importantly, when it is not.

​Collectively, these steps would modernise CCI’s enforcement mechanism without overreaching its authority. These reforms would allow CCI to respond proportionately to the complexities of ​duopolistic markets, thereby ensuring that the law is in line with the evolving market.

In conclusion, recognising collective dominance is a necessary step for India’s competition law standards, as the current framework leaves significant gaps in regulation as market structures evolve towards interdependence and concentrated control, thereby limiting enforcement to individual dominance.  In order to tackle these difficulties, the CCI should move forward with reforms that allow the evaluation of dominant power exercised jointly, based on the already existing jurisprudence of the European Union; such reforms would not only make the Indian framework international-level but also able to respond successfully to the complex market dynamics. This change would represent a major milestone in the development of India's antitrust law and in its recognition as a modern competition regime.

About the Author

Akshat Gaur and Shravan Kadyan are second-year law students at the Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, Lucknow, with interests in competition law and market regulation.

This article was written as part of academic research on evolving challenges in Indian antitrust enforcement.