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Vashmath Potluri and Shubhranshu

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7

Rethinking Effects in Digital Markets: A Structural and Probabilistic Framework

10 November 2025

Introduction In the recent NCLAT proceedings, Meta contended that the Competition Commission of India’s ( “CCI” ) case concerning WhatsApp’s 2021 Privacy Policy relies on hypothetical scenarios and future conduct , arguing that no concrete evidence demonstrates actual harm in the relevant market for online display advertising. This line of reasoning reflects the Supreme Court’s approach in CCI v. Schott Glass  ( “ Schott Glass ” ), which underscores the need for demonstrable competitive...

Sarvika Singh and Tathaagat S Siddharth

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6

Buying Off Complaints? CCI v. Monsanto and the Misuse of Private Settlements

10 November 2025

Private settlements in competition cases are on the rise, especially after the Supreme Court’s nod in Monsanto. While this speeds up dispute resolution, it sidelines the CCI and weakens public oversight. This post explores how such settlements risk enabling dominant firms to avoid scrutiny, create moral hazard, and deter whistleblowers and why the balanced approach of the Madras High Court still matters for safeguarding fair markets.

Shivam Singh and Priyanshi Jain

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7

False Comfort of Nascent Market: Reassessing the Position of Strength in age of AI Market

10 November 2025

A small group of AI firms now controls powerful foundation models, data pipelines, and cloud infrastructure. Yet they claim the sector is still “nascent” to avoid scrutiny. This piece explains how narrow market definition, data advantages, and ecosystem lock-in entrench dominance, and why competition regulators must reassess market power to protect innovation and consumer choice.

Editorial Board

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5

The Codification of Hub-and-Spoke Cartels: How will the cards play out?

1 September 2025

Hub-and-spoke cartels are horizontal arrangements between producers or suppliers located vertically in relation to other players in a market. Those situated horizontally are called the spokes and they engage in concerted anti-competitive action. The hub is vertically situated and colludes with the spoke to produce anti-competitive outcomes. These are often instances of indirect coordination and are difficult to prove in terms of substantive evidence. The primary obstacle in dealing with their...

Editorial Board

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7

The Double-Edged Sword: Why India's New VSA Framework May Backfire?

1 September 2025

In 2012, India’s Ministry of Corporate Affairs (“MCA”) granted a blanket exemption for Vessel Sharing Agreements (“VSAs”) from Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002. Section 3 prohibits any agreement that causes or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition (“AAEC”) in the market. A VSA is a collaborative legal arrangement between shipping companies that allows them to share space on a cargo vessel. VSAs constitute a specific form of partnership, distinct from mergers or...

Editorial Board

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6

Between section 4 Competition Act and article 102 TFEU: Addressing the Collective Dominance gap in Indian Competition Law Enforcement

1 September 2025

In competition law, monopolists have always been considered the villains – towering giants accused of squeezing rivals, locking in consumers and stifling entry of newbies in the market – but what happens when the villain is not one, but a band of giants who never act in collusion, yet march to the same drumbeat? This is the puzzle of collective dominance that faces most competition authorities in contemporary markets. With oligopolistic markets on the rise, where a group of entities exercise...

Dialogue

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