Introduction

The regulatory landscape surrounding misleading advertisements in India is rapidly evolving, marked by a perceived paradox in the jurisdictional reach of the Competition Commission of India (CCI). The Commission’s recent rulings in cases such as XYZ Vs. Woodman Electronics India Pvt. Ltd. and Moses Pinto vs. Victor Hospital highlight a consistent preference to treat misleading advertising primarily as a consumer protection issue. These decisions depend on the idea that unless there is evidence of market dominance or a significant negative effect on competition, deceptive advertising is not covered by competition law. Instead, it better fits under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (COPRA).

This jurisprudential trend is significant, not simply for demarcating legal boundaries but for what it reveals about the Commission’s policy priorities. It underscores the importance placed on preserving a principled division of regulatory labour, thereby minimising jurisdictional overlap whilst ensuring consumer grievances are adequately addressed. However, this approach was questioned  in the case of Winzo Games vs. Google. The CCI’s investigation into Google’s practices focused on how selective approval of real-money gaming apps amounted to misleading and exclusionary conduct within its advertising ecosystem, linking deceptive behavior to market foreclosure rather than mere consumer deception. Such contrasting outcomes beg a critical question: what is the rationale behind CCI’s selective intervention based on market power, and does this approach effectively safeguard competitive market structures in India’s increasingly digitalised and fragmented economy? This article argues that misleading advertisements, when employed strategically by firms with significant market influence, can distort competitive dynamics by manipulating consumer preferences and erecting informational barriers that deter market entry.

Competition Law and Misleading Advertisements: Distinct Regulatory Paths

Competition law and consumer protection in India embody complementary yet distinct objectives. The Competition Act aims to improve market efficiency by minimizing anti-competitive actions that limit market entry, lessen consumer choice, or raise prices through unfair methods. On the other hand, consumer protection laws focus on preventing harm to individuals by giving power to consumers, especially through measures that address misleading or deceptive trade practices. 

The Consumer Protection Act, 2019, increased the tools available to fight misleading advertisements by creating the Central Consumer Protection Authority (CCPA). The Act clearly defines “misleading advertisement” to include false descriptions, false guarantees, hiding important information, or claims likely to mislead consumers about a product's quality, quantity, or nature. The CCPA enjoys broad powers, including the ability to order discontinuation of such advertisements and levy stiff penalties.

Conversely, the Competition Act restricts such concerns to instances where the conduct is capable of impacting “competition” at the market level. The key challenge and a recurring theme in CCI rulings has been to distinguish when a misleading advertisement or deceptive conduct is sufficiently potent to constitute an abuse of a dominant position or appreciable adverse effect on competition under Sections 3 or 4. This division of regulatory responsibility mitigates duplication and jurisdictional conflicts but has introduced operational complexities. The CCI’s position, as held in XYZ v. Woodman Electronics India (P.) Ltd., has largely been that the combative enforcement against such entities would fall outside its statutory mandate, reinforcing consumer protection channels as the appropriate forum for redress.

The Dominance Threshold: Analytical Clarity and Regulatory Gaps

The dominance threshold functions as a methodological anchor in the Commission’s analysis. Competition law intervention is justified only when misleading advertising forms part of an abuse of dominant position, rather than mere possession of dominance. The reasoning suggests that dominant companies have a huge influence over market dynamics due to their advertising efforts. This can potentially push out competitors or mislead consumers in ways that distort competition.

However, the economic conditions in Indian markets show a different picture. Many small and mid-sized firms can work together to sway consumer behaviour by spreading misleading information. This can include exaggerated health claims, hiding product origins, or overstating effectiveness, all of which affect overall demand and competition. Even in non-dominant markets, coordinated misleading advertisements by several small players can cumulatively distort consumer perception, creating unfair advantages and impacting the level playing field.

The Woodman Electronic case exemplifies this: The Commission noted the presence of multinational competitors and considered the market competitive despite the complainant’s claims of deceptive “Made in India” branding with obscured Chinese origins. This determination, while legally sound under the statute, arguably underestimates the adverse effects of misleading claims on consumer choices and the competition ecosystem, especially in sectors where origin may drive purchasing decisions. Similarly, in      Moses Pinto vs. Victor Hospital, the CCI rejected claims about misrepresentation of a surgeon’s qualifications as raising no competition law issue. The decision rested on an absence of evidence of market foreclosure or exclusionary effect due to the hospital’s conduct. While consumer deception may cause individual harm, without evidence that misrepresentation systematically disabled competitors, CCI recused itself in favour of consumer protection mechanisms.

These cases highlight the inherent limits of a dominance-focused regulatory approach when dealing with advertising markets increasingly impacted by network effects and consumer information asymmetries.

Digital Platforms and the Exception: The Case of Google

Digital market dynamics present novel regulatory challenges that demand a reassessment of traditional jurisdictional doctrines. The CCI’s investigation into Winzo Games vs. Google showcases an evolving analytical framework emphasizing ecosystem power, platform control, and the competitive consequences of selective advertising policies. Google’s dominant position in the Android operating system, app distribution, and online advertising provided the context to evaluate potentially exclusionary practices not in the abstract but with direct reference to market access. The Winzo Games information detailed how Google’s selective approval of certain real money gaming apps, while excluding others, constrained rival developers’ visibility and growth opportunities.

This platform-centric view reflects emerging competition law scholarship recognising that digital ecosystems give incumbents structural advantages that amplify the anti-competitive potential of even seemingly minor conduct. Network effects, data dominance, and mutually reinforcing market positions enable leading platforms to enforce subtle exclusions and shape consumer perception through controlled advertising environments.

The Commission’s approach in this case signals that misleading conduct merits competition scrutiny if and only if it operates within and reinforces ecosystem dominance to the competitive detriment of rivals and consumer choice. Unlike Woodman Electronics, where misleading claims were treated as isolated consumer concerns, Winzo Games viewed such conduct through a competition lens,  acknowledging that misleading advertising by dominant intermediaries can entrench market power. Moreover, the Winzo Games case illustrates critical jurisdictional challenges concerning platform intermediaries who claim mere facilitation roles. The CCI rejected simplistic claims of “neutral hosting” by platforms when their policies, algorithms, or content curation materially influence market outcomes, affirming competition law's applicability to dominant platforms’ advertising strategies.

Temporal, Cumulative, and Cross-Border Effects

Beyond the dominance criterion, the temporal and cumulative impacts of misleading advertising campaigns remain underexplored by the Commission. Misleading advertisements rarely function in isolation; often rolled out in waves as part of coordinated marketing or repeated brand campaigns, their aggregate effects on consumer beliefs and competitive dynamics may materialise only over time. Cumulative misleading campaigns may distort market structure by entrenching incumbents and deterring new entrants, harms that directly fall within competition law’s ambit. Traditional dominance and adverse effect inquiries tend to analyse competitive harm at discrete moments, limiting the ability to detect sustained or latent market distortions. This is particularly problematic as algorithmic advertising and digital personalisation allow for messaging interventions that dynamically adapt to and reinforce consumer biases across platforms. 

Internationally, cross-border digital advertising platforms complicate jurisdictional boundaries, as misleading claims spread through global networks. Indian consumers can be exposed to and influenced by advertisers from outside their jurisdiction. This situation requires coordination across different regulatory systems. The CCI and consumer protection authorities must strengthen cooperation across sectors and internationally to manage these challenges effectively.

Conclusion

The Indian regulatory approach to misleading advertisements is at a key point. While the CCI’s focus on market dominance maintains legal clarity and institutional efficiency, it risks ignoring many deceptive practices, especially in fragmented and digital-heavy sectors. The difference shown by the rulings in Woodman Electronics, Moses Pinto, and Winzo Games highlights the challenge of balancing consumer protection with competition safeguards. Moving beyond a binary jurisdictional framework requires a deep, multi-layered analysis that considers the realities of modern advertising and digital ecosystems. India can effectively protect competitive markets and consumer well-being in a time of rapidly changing advertising methods only by developing these approaches and improving coordination between agencies, along with creating forward-thinking regulations.

About the Authors

Student at Hidayatullah National Law University