This blog analyses the CCI’s 2025 Market Study on Artificial Intelligence and Competition, unpacking how data, compute power, and algorithms reshape market power. It examines merger control blind spots, risks of algorithmic collusion and discrimination, and the CCI’s push toward algorithmic accountability, situating India within the evolving global AI-competition framework.

Part II examines why conventional antitrust tools fail in concentrated markets where parallel, independent conduct causes long-term competitive harm. Using Indian case studies on duopolies, price wars, and exclusionary strategies, it argues that India’s refusal to recognise collective dominance leaves a statutory vacuum in oligopolistic markets that increasingly shape the economy.

Part I of this two-part series examines India’s refusal to recognise collective dominance under competition law. It traces the doctrine’s origins in EU jurisprudence, surveys its international reception, and analyses India’s statutory position, revealing the enforcement gaps that arise in oligopolistic markets driven by parallel but independent conduct.

This post explains why classic competition tools struggle with digital platforms and shows how data advantages, defaults and network effects shape market power. It reviews key CCI cases, compares global models, and sets out a balanced framework for India that mixes targeted ex-ante duties with strong ex-post enforcement and practical tools for smaller market actors.

This post explores the jurisdictional gap in how India handles misleading advertisements. It looks at why the CCI limits its role to cases involving dominance, how decisions in Woodman Electronics, Moses Pinto, and Winzo Games reveal inconsistencies, and why digital platforms complicate the line between consumer protection and competition law.

This blog breaks down how India’s merger control regime is evolving as the CCI tightens scrutiny on M&A deals. From gun-jumping penalties to the rise of the Green Channel and deeper reviews in complex mergers, it explores how regulatory shifts are shaping deal timelines, corporate strategy, and the future of competition oversight in India.

The Asian Paints–Birla Opus dispute offers a sharp window into how India handles abuse of dominance cases. While the CCI has opened a probe, the controversy highlights deeper gaps in Section 26(2A), where vague standards and wide discretion blur the line between repeat claims and fresh grievances. This piece unpacks those ambiguities and the broader challenges that limit effective enforcement.

Introduction In the recent NCLAT proceedings, Meta contended that the Competition Commission of India’s ( “CCI” ) case concerning WhatsApp’s 2021 Privacy Policy relies on hypothetical scenarios and future conduct , arguing that no concrete evidence demonstrates actual harm in the relevant market for online display advertising. This line of reasoning reflects the Supreme Court’s approach in CCI v. Schott Glass  ( “ Schott Glass ” ), which underscores the need for demonstrable

Private settlements in competition cases are on the rise, especially after the Supreme Court’s nod in Monsanto. While this speeds up dispute resolution, it sidelines the CCI and weakens public oversight. This post explores how such settlements risk enabling dominant firms to avoid scrutiny, create moral hazard, and deter whistleblowers and why the balanced approach of the Madras High Court still matters for safeguarding fair markets.

Hub-and-spoke cartels are horizontal arrangements between producers or suppliers located vertically in relation to other players in a market. Those situated horizontally are called the spokes and they engage in concerted anti-competitive action. The hub is vertically situated and colludes with the spoke to produce anti-competitive outcomes. These are often instances of indirect coordination and are difficult to prove in terms of substantive evidence. The primary obstacle in d

In 2012, India’s Ministry of Corporate Affairs (“MCA”) granted a blanket exemption for Vessel Sharing Agreements (“VSAs”) from Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002. Section 3 prohibits any agreement that causes or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition (“AAEC”) in the market. A VSA is a collaborative legal arrangement between shipping companies that allows them to share space on a cargo vessel. VSAs constitute a specific form of partnership, distinc

In competition law, monopolists have always been considered the villains – towering giants accused of squeezing rivals, locking in consumers and stifling entry of newbies in the market – but what happens when the villain is not one, but a band of giants who never act in collusion, yet march to the same drumbeat? This is the puzzle of collective dominance that faces most competition authorities in contemporary markets. With oligopolistic markets on the rise, where a group of e