As digital giants tighten their grip on global markets, regulators face a crucial choice: regulate in advance or litigate after harm occurs. Comparing the EU’s ex-ante Digital Markets Act, the US’s ex-post litigation model, and India’s cautious middle path, this piece argues that the real solution lies not in picking sides but in designing a balanced, adaptive framework that protects competition without stifling innovation.

This blog compares the FTC under Lina Khan and India’s Competition Commission in navigating the IP–antitrust interface. It argues that Khan’s structural, effects-based approach treats IP as a potential tool of exclusion in digital markets, while the CCI remains cautious under Section 3(5) of the Competition Act. Through cases like Amazon and Google, it highlights divergent regulatory philosophies shaping platform governance.

As AI-driven pricing algorithms reshape digital markets, competition law faces a new challenge: algorithmic collusion without human agreement. This article examines why India’s Competition Act, 2002 struggles to address self-learning algorithmic collusion under Section 3, and proposes regulatory and enforcement reforms to future-proof antitrust law in the age of artificial intelligence.