Rethinking Competition Law for Platform Markets

Introduction

Digital platforms like search engines, social media apps, app stores and large online marketplaces work differently from traditional businesses.They collect huge amounts of user data and reuse it across services, they get better the more people use them, and they become more valuable as their user base grows. These features combine to create durable competitive advantages that are not easily undone by new entrants or temporary fixes. Where classic industrial markets are judged largely by price, output and market share, platform markets can harm competition through lock-in, restricted access to crucial datasets or distribution channels, and exclusionary design choices that favour incumbents. Calvano and Polo show that digital markets are prone to concentration because of network effects and the need for large data endowments, which changes how we should think about market definition and competition policy. Since these risks flow from technical design and long-term data accumulation rather than only from short-term price movements, regulatory responses need to look beyond the familiar price-focused lens to the realities of data, defaults, Application Programming Interface (API) access and network dynamics. To explore these challenges, this paper will first analyze recent CCI case laws to identify current limitations, then compare dominant international approaches, and finally propose a calibrated framework for India.

Case Laws

Recent CCI interventions illustrate the conceptual advance and the technical limits of contemporary competition enforcement. The Android/Google inquiry, investigations into parity and most-favoured-nation (MFN) clauses on electronic marketplaces, and the review of Meta’s acquisition of WhatsApp each highlight a distinct vector by which platform power is sustained.

In its Android probes, the CCI examined how Google tied key services to Android devices through pre-installation, placement on home screens and default settings. The commission’s orders focused on loosening forced bundling, a practice investigated as a potential contravention of Section 4(2)(d) (tying) and Section 4(2)(e) (leveraging) of the Competition Act, and improving rivals’ access to users, but most remedies addressed contractual and distribution arrangements rather than the underlying technical architecture. Even with changes to pre-installation rules, incumbents often retain privileged system-level controls like special APIs, update channels, and the default user experience that most consumers encounter when they first use a device, as well as vast historical behavioural datasets that feed recommendation and advertising systems. Those technical levers mean that unbundling applications can help, but it rarely restores true competitive parity on its own.

Investigations into clauses used by major e-commerce platforms that force sellers to match prices or give the platform “most-favoured” status, preventing sellers from offering better deals on rival sites and making competition harder.. Such clauses are examined as potential anti- competitive vertical agreements under Section 3(4) of the Competition Act, 2002, which are prohibited if they cause an Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition (AAEC). Regulators have sought to curb or ban such clauses to restore sellers’ freedom to price and promote across channels. However, practical constraints such as lack of time for small and medium sellers, tools or expertise to detect breaches etc continue to plague the system. Enforcement is often complaint-driven and resource-intensive. Platforms can continue to influence outcomes through control of search rankings, sponsored placements, logistics and visibility, all of which shape sellers’ incentives even without explicit parity provisions. The Competition Commission of India’s scrutiny of WhatsApp’s data practices brought these issues into sharp focus: the CCI examined the messaging app’s 2021 privacy changes and raised concerns about take-it-or-leave-it data-sharing terms that linked WhatsApp data with other services in the same corporate group. This was investigated as a potential abuse of dominance under Section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Competition Act, which prohibits the imposition of ‘unfair or discriminatory conditions on the consumers.  That case illustrates the point that even when a messenger uses end-to-end encryption and cannot read message text, the platform still gathers rich metadata (who communicates with whom, when and where, and how interactions cluster) and can fuse those signals with social graphs, ad profiles and payment histories to build powerful targeting and recommendation systems. Regulators can, and have, required greater transparency, limited certain forms of cross-service reuse, and imposed directions to curb specific data flows; however, the cumulative effect of years of linked data and deep product integration means that simple fixes such as disclosure or consent boxes rarely eliminate the incumbent’s advantage without complementary technical or structural remedies.

Analysis

Taken together, the cases show a consistent pattern: remedies that focus on contracts, disclosure or user consent are useful first steps, but they are frequently insufficient where incumbents have amassed technical advantages and network effects over time. Contractual unbundling or bans on specific clauses can open space for rivals, but they do not automatically produce the interoperable data, developer access or user-transfer mechanisms that rival services need to compete effectively. Disclosure rules improve visibility but leave the underlying asymmetry untouched. The key challenge is that data and network effects compound: small advantages today can generate feedback loops that make reversal costly later, which means the timing and design of remedies matters as much as their existence.

Internationally, two broad regulatory models have emerged. One model relies on ex-ante, rules-based obligations for a set of identified “gatekeepers.” This ex-ante shift was heavily influenced by foundational reports, such as the “Competition Policy for the Digital Era” (The Cremer Report), 2019, which argued that traditional ex-post enforcement was often ‘too little, too late’ for digital markets. The idea is to define measurable duties, for example, data portability, no self-preferencing, and certain interoperability requirements, and apply them to platforms that meet objective indicators of gatekeeper status. It brings certainty and can stop lock-in, but it risks being too broad and may not keep up with fast technological change. The alternative model remains the traditional ex-post, case-by-case enforcement of competition law which is present in countries like the USA. This model relies on foundational antitrust laws, such as Section 2 of the U.S. Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolization and is the basis for litigation against large tech platforms. It is more flexible and fact-sensitive, allowing regulators to tailor remedies to the particular market features at issue, but it is often slow and reactive; by the time a definitive remedy is reached, the incumbent’s lead may be entrenched by data and network effects, making full restoration of competition impractical (a finding echoed by the UK’s Furman Report, 2019).

For India, a middle path that combines the strengths of both approaches appears most suited to the domestic market. First, publish clear, rebuttable indicators that flag when a platform is likely to pose systemic competitive risks, for example sustained share of active users, unusually long average session times compared with rivals, or effective control over distribution channels such as app stores and pre-installation. These indicators should be public so firms understand the thresholds that trigger additional scrutiny, but they must also be rebuttable to avoid over-inclusion and to respect firm-specific differences in business models. Second, when indicators are met, apply a lightweight gatekeeper regime that imposes a limited set of ex-ante duties that are concrete and technically testable. Duties should include interoperability for core features where network effects are central to user value, measurable constraints on self-preferencing, and clear limits on parity clauses. This view is supported by the recent Report of the Committee on Digital Competition Law (CDCL), 2024, which recommended a separate, ex- ante legislative framework for ‘Systematically Significant Digital Enterprises’ (SSDEs) to supplement the existing ex- post regime of the Competition Act, 2022. This report recommends a narrower path through which the actions of Enterprises with ‘significant presence’ can be regulated effectively. Third, retain and strengthen ex-post investigatory powers and preserve structural remedies as last-resort options to be used only after rigorous proportionality analysis. Behavioural remedies should be the default because they are less disruptive, but authorities must keep open the option of dataset ring-fencing or functional separation where behavioural fixes cannot remove systemic advantages.

Finally, the framework must recognise practical enforcement constraints and the asymmetric position of small market actors. Designated reporting portals, plain-language guidance, and publicly accessible summaries of enforcement decisions will help small sellers and developers understand their rights and spot abuses. Where monitoring requires technical evidence that small actors cannot produce, regulators should empower accredited third-party auditors or provide mechanisms for collective complaints so information asymmetries do not stymie enforcement. Remedies should be time-bound and verifiable: machine-readable APIs, FRAND (fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory) access terms where appropriate, and interim compliance milestones will make enforcement less dependent on protracted litigation.

Conclusion

Platform competition problems are driven less by short-term price changes and more by the long-term build-up of data, network effects and technical hooks, so regulators must design responses with that reality in mind. A balanced approach for India that uses public, rebuttable indicators to spot high-risk platforms, imposes a narrow set of testable ex-ante duties when justified, preserves strong ex-post investigative powers, creates a technical unit to turn legal duties into engineering checks, and makes enforcement accessible and verifiable for smaller actors can address platform power without needlessly stifling innovation while preserving incentives for legitimate innovation.

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